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CRIMIXVAL LAW COMMENTS
Federal Protection Against State Searches and Seizures
During its next term, the United States Supreme Court must dispose
of two cases which involve the issue of whether or not the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, guaranteed through the federal
courts by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,' will be extended
to cover state action. The cases are similar in nature, and in each it is
claimed that the freedom from unreasonable search and seizure is a
fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Fong v. Superior Court,2 money, guns and other items were taken
from the tourist cabin of the petitioners by detectives who suspected
Fong and the others of being involved in a burglary.3 Subsequently, the
petitioners were charged with a burglary other than that which the
detectives were investigating, and the state seeks to use this evidence
to support the charge. Petitioners claim that the arrest was made without
probable cause, and seek return of their property before their case goes
to trial.4 The state court denied their petition for return of personal
property, without reference to the federal constitutional problem raised
by petitioners, and the latter seek a review of the Washington court's
adverse decision. In Wolf v. People of Colorado,5 the record books of a
physician were seized by officers who entered his office without a warrant
and names taken from the books were used to obtain witnesses and ulti-
mately a conviction against the physician for abortion.6 The conviction
is appealed on the ground that the evidence was illegally obtained and
thus could not be used at the trial.
It is clear from a consideration of the facts in both cases that the con-
duct of the police officers would transgress the rules laid down by the
United States Supreme Court to test the reasonableness of searches by
federal agents. 7 However, in order to reach the merits of the cases on
appeal, the Supreme Court would have to decide that the Federal Con-
1 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
2 _Wash.__, 188 P. (2d) 125 (1948).
3 The detectives who made the arrest suspected the relator Fong of being involved
in a burglary, but had obtained no warrant for his arrest. The burglary for which
Fong and two others were subsequently indicted occurred the night before the arrest
and had no relation to the previous burglary which the detectives were investigating.
4 Fong also filed a petition for the suppression of the evidence thus obtained, but
no appeal was carried when the petition was denied. The appeal in this case is
from an order of the Washington court denying the petition for the return of personal
property, which would accomplish the same result as a suppression order.
5- Colo. , 187 P. (2d) 926 (1947).
6 The records were seized in the absence of the physician and used to contact
women whose names appeared therein. These women were subsequently used as
witnesses in the abortion prosecution.
7 In the Fong case, the arrest upon which the search was predicated was made
without probable cause, as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court. United States v.
Leftkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Johnson v. United States, 332 U.S. 10 (1947).
See Ely, Probable Cause in Connection with Applications for Search Warrants (1928)
13 St. Louis L. Rev. 101. In the Wolf case, although the officers apparently had
probable cause, their failure to procure a search warrant where the opportunity was
open would render the seizure unreasonable under the rules laid down by the Supreme
Court. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
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stitution protects the petitioners against an unreasonable search and
seizure. If this decision were reached by the Court then the petitioners
in the Washington case will have succeeded, since Washington follows
the federal rule8 in holding that evidence illegally obtained cannot be
used at the trial. The Colorado case, however, cannot be disposed of on
this issue. Colorado adheres to the majority rule that matter obtained
through an unlawful search and seizure may nevertheless be used as evi-
dence to convict the accused. 9 Even were the Supreme Court to decide
that the protection of the Fourth Amendment is afforded to the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth, they would still have
to make the federal rule relating to the suppression of evidence appli-
cable to state courts in order to reverse the Colorado court's decision.
Considering the main issue involved, which concerns the incorporation
of the Fourth Amendment's protection into the Fourteenth, it must be
noted at the outset that this question has never been squarely before the
Supreme Court. In one case which raised this issue, Adams v. New York,"
the Court held that since the search and seizure were reasonable, there
was no occasion to consider the constitutional problem. 1 The same con-
clusion was reached in Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont.'2 In
several other pertinent cases, the Court has held that the protection of
the Fourth Amendment does not extend to cover state action, but in none
of these cases was the argument made that the same protection is afforded
as "due process" by the Fourteenth Amendment.
13
The rules for applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights through the
due process clause have been well established by that famous trilogy of
cases, Twining v. New Jersey,14 Palko v. Connecticut,15 and Adamson v.
California,1 6 in the second one of which the Court stated the due process
requirements in broad terms, noting that the claimed right or fieedom
must be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'1 or "a principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental.' u8 In accord with this line of reasoning the
8 The federal rule is followed by 18 states. For compilation of cases, see Annota-
tion, Suppression of Evidence Unlawfully Obtained, 150 A.L.R. 566 (1944).
9 Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 P. 1019 (1925). This rule is followed
by 28 states. See note 8, supra.
10 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
11 The court assumed the contention of appellant, that the fourth amendment 's
protection was available against state action, and then considered the merits of the
search and seizure issue.
12 207 U.S. 541 (1908).
13 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The lower federal courts have
consistently ruled that the fourth amendment is not applicable, but without any con-
sideration of the fourteenth. Kanellos v. United States, 282 Fed. 461 (C.C.A. 4th,
1922); Robinson v. United States, 292 Fed. 683 (C.C.A. 9th, 1923). In Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), the court also held that there was no occasion to decide
the question. The court below had held that the fourth amendment's protection was
guaranteed by the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Hague v. CIO, 101 F. (2d) 787 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1939). This argument has been ex-
pressly repudiated by the Supreme Court, first in the Slavghterhouse Cases, 16 Wall.
(U.S.) 36 (1873), and later in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). For a
complete discussion of the development of the privileges and immunities clause, see
Konvitz. The Constitution and Civil Rights (1st ed. 1947) 29-47.
14 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
15 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
16 332 U. S. 46 (1946).
17 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
18 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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Court has held that rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
amendments do not meet these requirements, 19 but it has seen fit to in-
clude in the due process interpretation freedoms of press, speech, re-
ligion and assembly. 20 It is certainly possible to argue soundly and
validly that the freedom from unreasonable search and seizure should
be placed on a par with these other freedoms. 21 The Court itself has
stated many times that it is a fundamental freedom which is vitally
necessary to our free form of government. 22 Indeed, its history as a right
sought in the protection of citizens against the arbitrary action of gov-
ernment can be traced back to the time of the -Magna Charta.23 There
is certainly an excellent prospect that the Supreme Court will find that
this freedom fits the doctrines previously laid down by it in the Twining
and Palko cases.
24
A further argument in support of this view can be made by pointing
out that the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect the citizen against
the arbitrary action of government police officials. As such, it can better
be grouped with the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment-
freedoms which have been read into the due process clause. The Fourth
Amendment cannot be grouped with the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh, since
they are protective guarantees against the arbitrary action of the judi-
ciary,25 and the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot logically be termed a procedural matter which should be left to
the discretion of the state courts.
Even assuming, however, that the Court will thus extend the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, this will still not dispose of the Colorado
case. The further question arises as to whether or not the Supreme Court
will hold that the federal rule of exclusion of evidence illegally obtained
will be applied to all states. An affirmative answer might be indicated
by those federal cases which hold that the protection of the Fourth
Amendment would be illusory if not buttressed by the rule of exclu-
sion.26 On the other hand, the court has been disinclined to bind the
19 Double-jeopardy, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Self-incrimination,
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); grand jury indictment, Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 U.S. 516 (1883); indictment and trial by jury, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S.
581 (1899).
20 Freedom of speech, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1936) ; freedom of press,
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1935); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1930) ; freedom of religion, Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); freedom
of assembly, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1936).
21 In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 163 (1946), the court stated: "How can
there be freedom of thought or freedom of speech or freedom of religion if the police
can, without warrant, search your house and mine from garret to cellar merely because
they are executing a warrant of arrestf How can men feel free if all their papers
may be searched, as an incident to the arrest of someone in the house, on the chance
that something may turn up, or rather be turned up! Yesterday the justifying docu-
ment was an illicit ration book, tomorrow it may be some suspect piece of literature. I '
22 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 479 (1927) ; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478, 479 (1893).
23 For origin of the requirement of a search warrant, see Fraenkel, Concerning
Searches and Seizures (1920) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361. Lord Coke stated that the im-
proper use of search warrants is against the Magna Charta. Institutes, Bk. 4, pp. 176,
177 cited in People ex rel. Simpson v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794 (1913).
24 See notes 17 and 18, supra.
25 e.g. fifth amendment: double jeopardy, self-incrimination: sixth amendment:
right to trial by jury in criminal cases; seventh amendment: right to trial by jury in
civil cases.
26 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) ; Silverthorne v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 391 (1919).
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